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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Uruguay's Tupamaros: The New Breed of Revolutionary

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URUGUAY'S TUPAMAROS: THE NEW BREED OF REVOLUTIONARY

In the last 15 years Uruguay has degenerated from an economically thriving democracy into an aimless, drifting nation. Nothing has exemplified its recent troubles so dramatically as the rise of the terrorist National Liberation Movement, popularly known as the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros are representative of the new breed of terrorist in Latin America. During the past few years the organization's successes have been the most spectacular on the continent, and the group has influenced terrorists in other countries. Disregarding the guidelines laid down by such romantic revolutionaries as Che Guevara and Regis Debray, the Tupamaros have concentrated their operations in the city rather than in the countryside, and they typify the flexible approach to revolution currently in vogue in Latin America. Taking maximum advantage of a generally permissive society and of security forces unaccustomed to anything except political tranquility, the terrorists have grown from a political curiosity into a major problem for the Pacheco government. Imaginative and daring, they continue to recruit successfully, and the government's efforts against them, though becoming more effective, have yet to curb their attacks.

The guerrillas are currently in the second phase of their planned revolutionary offensive. Having concentrated on attracting public support and building their organizational network, they now aim to sow fear and confusion in the government before moving to total confrontation. In earlier years the terrorists' tactics emphasized exposé and political embarrassment of the government, but intimidation and assassination are now more important parts of their strategy. A tactical objective is to force the government to depart from the democratic principles that have governed Uruguayan political life for more than a century, a goal that is being pursued with some success. The scheduled presidential and congressional elections in November furnish the group with another opportunity to disrupt society.

Barring a major overreaction by the government, the guerrillas are not a major threat to stability under the present circumstances. Nevertheless, the administration has shown that it cannot eradicate the organization with present methods, and the group is likely to be a disruptive facet of the Uruguayan political scene for the next several years. It has become a symbol of the government's drift and of society's resulting frustration.

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The Roots of Frustration

Until the mid-1950s, Uruguay was touted as the "Switzerland of Latin America," a seeming anomaly in the political chaos that often swept the continent. The country was a showcase of social reform as a result of the progressive labor and welfare statutes adopted early in this century. The two-party governmental system functioned smoothly; during the years 1952-67 the country adopted a plural executive system patterned on the Swiss model. The population, basically of European descent, was highly literate and nearly fully employed.

The system, however, extracted a price. The burgeoning welfare network was laudable in theory. But it became a staggering economic burden for a government caught in a financial pinch precipitated by falling export earnings and prolonged economic stagnation that helped bring on an inflationary spiral. The essentially pastoral economy fell further behind the times with each passing year. The plural executive, and the sentiment that led to its creation, acted as an effective brake on the much needed exercise of strong executive leadership. The rolls of government employees became bloated, and administration was inefficient. Neither the Colorados, who ruled for 93 years, nor the Blancos, who served from 1959-67, were able to halt the decline, and the country's complex political system operated to discourage the emergence of an alternative. Older Uruguayans were mildly disaffected by the recollection of better times, and the educated youth were dissatisfied with a system that they regarded as an anachronism. Thus, Uruguay was ripe for exploitation by a determined group of dissidents.

The Birth of a Movement: 1962-66

Although the National Liberation Movement (MLN) did not emerge as an organizational entity until 1966, its origins date back to the early 1960s and center around the activities of Raul Sendic, one of the founders of the group. Sendic was a law-school dropout and a member of the

Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU). By 1962 he had become a well-known peasant leader in the northern part of the country. He organized dramatic marches on the capital to emphasize demands for better treatment of rural workers, but despite his success as an organizer, his efforts had limited practical results. At the same time, the PSU suffered a serious setback in the 1962 elections. The lack of success at the polls and mounting dissatisfaction with the soft-line leadership of the party prompted Sendic and others to leave the Socialist organization, and they soon abandoned the parliamentary process for good. Sendic became a fugitive after he led a raid on a gun club in 1963, and he moved his base of operations from the rural northwest to the capital soon after this incident.

Sendic and other Marxist dissidents from the PSU, along with some members of the peasant groups he had organized, formed the core of the MLN. They were probably joined by several anarchists, whose own movement had faded from the prominence it enjoyed in earlier decades, and by a few radical independents. The entire group numbered no more than a few dozen. During the period 1963-66 the group, or its members, carried out isolated terrorist acts such as robberies. They won considerable publicity at Christmastime in 1963 with the theft and redistribution of meat in a poor section of the capital.

Another example of the group's flair for public relations that was later to bedevil the government was the terrorists' christening of the movement as the MLN-Tupamaros. Tupamaro is a shortened form of Tupac Amaru, the name adopted by an Inca descendant who led a major uprising against the Spanish crown in the viceroyalty of Peru in 1781. Although the revolt was bloodily crushed, Tupamaro has become synonymous with a call to revolution against the oppressor. Artigas, the father of Uruguayan independence, and his gaucho followers were also known as Tupamaros during their guerrilla war against foreign forces in the 19th century.

The organizational structure of the MLN began to emerge in 1966, when the first National

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Convention, attended by about 20 members, was held. The organization's statutes call for the convocation of a national convention at least once every 18 months, circumstances permitting, but except for a second meeting in 1967 and perhaps a third in 1968, no conclaves are known to have been held. In any event, the group does not place heavy reliance on formal structure. Central leadership, to the extent that it is exercised, is vested in an Executive Committee, which has full powers between meetings of the National Convention. Sendic apparently was a member of this directorate.

The basic unit of the organization is the cell, which can be set up with only two people. Considerable autonomy is granted to the cell leader. The MLN "constitution" specifically notes the need for strategic centralism to be superseded at times by tactical autonomy. Cells are divided into political and military commands, both of which must approve projects based on their political advantage and military feasibility. The membership is organized into legal, semilegal, and clandestine categories, depending upon the extent of identification with the organization. The "constitution" also provides for the formation of peripheral cells by individuals who are not members of the organization nor subject to the bylaws, but who can be utilized for support tasks of a financial, intelligence, or general nature.

Compartmentalization and clandestinity have been the case in fact as well as in theory. An emphasis on self-sufficiency has held down the need for communications; when couriers are necessary both high and low level members are utilized, and their identities are often unknown to their contacts. MLN documents scrupulously avoid the mention of members' names and numbers. As a result, police raids on one cell have only rarely led to the discovery of others.

Revolutionary Philosophy—A Flexible Approach

MLN documents pay lip service to the traditional Marxist-Leninist concept: destruction of

the state apparatus, dictatorship of the proletariat, and the socialization of all means of production. For the most part, however, MLN working papers studiously avoid getting bogged down in philosophical verbiage and detailed analysis. They concentrate instead on the examination of operational techniques and strategic concepts. The emphasis stems in part from the movement's conviction that the revolution is subject to unpredictable events (such as economic downturns or foreign intervention) over which the MLN has no control and that strategy and tactics are in a constant state of flux. They also reveal a pervasive anarchistic sentiment.

From its inception, the Tupamaros' organization has concentrated the revolutionary struggle in the cities, ignoring the more traditional rural activity popularized by Castro, Guevara, and Debray. Uruguay lacks the conditions necessary for prolonged guerrilla struggle in the countryside. The rural terrain is predominantly flat and offers little protection. Eighty-two percent of the people live in urban areas, and political activity is concentrated in Montevideo, the capital, which contains half the population. The city supplies the movement with recruits, and communications and logistical problems are minimized in urban areas.

Nonetheless, the movement has not completely disavowed traditional concepts. It envisions a continent-wide struggle, with the development of "many Vietnams" in which Uruguay may act as a supply zone for the guerrilla struggle in other countries. During the national stage of the struggle, Tupamaro documents contemplate the use of rural areas to establish diversionary fronts. Practicality, however, has forced them to concentrate most of their activities in Montevideo.

The Revolution: Phase I 1966-69

A pamphlet signed by the Tupamaros was found after a bombing incident in mid-1965, but the organization did not begin to receive real public attention until December 1966, when a

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
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Uruguay's relatively small land area and general lack of forests or mountains, in conjunction with its predominantly urban population (82%) which is distributed throughout the country, make it unsuited for a prolonged rural guerrilla insurgency.

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police investigation of a stolen vehicle erupted into a gunfight and the first MLN member was killed. He was one of the few casualties on either side during this preliminary stage of activity. Subsequent investigations revealed the locations of three MLN operational sites, and police began to devote more attention to the fledgling group.

During these years, the Tupamaros concentrated their energies on a Madison Avenue approach to revolution: popularizing the struggle and selling their revolutionary line to the people. Violence was shunned for the most part, and operations were designed to embarrass the government while at the same time building the organization's prestige and attracting recruits. Between the end of 1966 and mid-1969, only one guerrilla and two policemen were killed.

During this period, the Tupamaros' strategy had considerable impact. In addition to robberies and bombings, they mounted many spectacular and publicity-grabbing operations. In mid-1968, they kidnaped a generally unpopular administration official who was a personal friend and adviser to the president and released him unharmed after a five-day detention. In early 1969 they robbed a finance company and turned over the company's books to judicial authorities, charging high government officials with questionable financial deals. A cabinet minister resigned shortly thereafter. During a five-month period later in the year, the terrorists seized control of several radio stations and broadcast propaganda appeals. In addition, they used their own portable transmitter both to take over the frequencies of local radio programs and to broadcast on their own frequency. The police were unable to locate the transmitter. To mark the visit of Governor Rockefeller in 1969, the terrorists burned the offices of General Motors, causing damages estimated at \$1 million. After several of the more spectacular thefts, the Tupamaros offered to return the money and valuables that were the property of the "common man."

The group's choice of targets, its nonviolent approach to revolution, and its unbroken string of

successes made it a household word in Uruguay. Magazine and newspaper articles touted its members as modern Robin Hoods. By early 1969, a local opinion poll reported that 40 percent of the people surveyed believed that the MLN was a group of well-intentioned revolutionaries. In tacit recognition of the success of its strategy, President Pacheco imposed censorship laws in mid-1969 that forbade any mention of the MLN or publication of the word Tupamaros.

Phase II: Post 1969

A captured MLN document dated mid-1969 discussed the end of the period of construction of the "minimum strategic revolutionary organization" and focused on the beginning of a period of broadened objectives, including a "systematic confrontation with the regime." From mid-1969 onward, it became increasingly apparent that the terrorists had decided to abandon their Robin Hood role and to place increasing emphasis on violence. In half a dozen simultaneous attacks on police in early July, five policemen were disarmed and one was killed.

In October, the guerrillas commemorated the death of Che Guevara with their boldest operation to date. About 40 or 50 terrorists, disguised as members of a funeral procession, raided the town of Pando, about 15 miles from the capital, robbed three banks, and took over the local police and fire stations. Police and riot control forces from Montevideo converged quickly on the town, however; gun battles resulted in the death of three MLN members and one bystander and the wounding of three policemen. Twenty of the terrorists were captured, and the money taken from the banks was recovered. In addition to causing significant personnel losses, the Pando raid destroyed the MLN's aura of invincibility and drained away public support. This operation may have been a maximum effort for the MLN at the time.

the organization had been forced to use a number of

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high-level members in the effort because of the inexperience of some members of the raiding party.

Despite such reverses, the Tupamaros have actively pressed their violent strategy. Early in 1970, the police formed a new counterterrorist unit to deal with the MLN; the chief of the unit was assassinated soon after his appointment. In May, the Tupamaros pulled a surprise raid on the naval training center in Montevideo and carried off about 400 weapons and significant quantities of ammunition without firing a shot. During the subsequent search operations by security forces, the Tupamaros again attacked individual policemen, killing one and wounding three others.


From a public relations standpoint, the terrorists' most serious gaffe occurred as a result of their multiple kidnap operations in July and August of 1970. In the space of a week, the terrorists took three hostages and narrowly missed on three other attempts. When the government refused their demand that it release all "political prisoners" in exchange for US AID adviser Dan Mitrione, he was murdered. Subsequent reporting has raised some doubt as to whether the murder of Mitrione resulted from a high-level policy decision or from panic when the massive police search operations under way brought the arrest of several high-level MLN figures. The fact that

Mitrione's case was the only example among the ten kidnappings credited to the MLN where the group's demands were backed by the threat to execute the hostage favors the argument that his murder was a calculated policy decision.

Mitrione's murder caused the first widespread public outcry against the terrorists and increased the public's support for the security forces. Because of the general sense of revulsion created by the killing, the populace was more prone to furnish the police with anonymous leads.

The Government's Countercampaign

The arrest of Sendic and eight other MLN activists in a raid in August 1970 was one of the first major police successes against the terrorists. Before mid-1970, the guerrillas for the most part had been successful in seizing and holding the initiative against security forces. The police response to Tupamaro operations was often slow and investigations sloppy. Coordination between branches of the government was at times quite poor; intelligence was inadequate. The entire security system suffered from careless operation. The prisons, for example, were administered by the Ministry of Culture rather than by the Ministry of Interior or by the security forces—a reflection of the Uruguayan emphasis on rehabilitation



Raul Sendic Antonaccio,
imprisoned MLN leader

*"A country for all—or no country
at all." (Tupamaro slogan)*



President Jorge Pacheco Areco

*"I refuse to serve merely as Uruguay's
undertaker; I will be President."*

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The intensive use of city-wide sweep patrolling in the capital has resulted in numerous arrests of terrorists.

rather than detention. When the terrorists staged a "spectacular" prison break in March of 1970 and freed 13 imprisoned female members of the band, the women were reportedly being guarded by one unarmed sentry and a group of nuns. The minister of culture resigned after the incident.

Steps have been taken to correct some of the more obvious government failings. Responsibility for the prison system was transferred to the Ministry of Interior in January 1971. The administration also is considering building a new high-security prison facility to house the more important Tupamaro prisoners. The reaction time of

the Montevideo police has improved measurably, and there has been a serious effort to establish an intelligence network. Intensive sweep patrolling in the capital and constant raids have resulted in the imprisonment of large numbers of terrorists: by the end of 1970, 344 Tupamaros had been arrested and more than 250 remained jailed.

The police roundup especially has had an impact on the guerrillas. In 1970, the terrorists began to place greater emphasis on relatively low-level harassment of police and prominent citizens—a reflection not only of a change in tactics but possibly of a lack of experienced

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militants as well. Some of their operations resembled training missions. The clocklike precision that had characterized earlier efforts gave way to a greater number of incidents more amateurish in nature. Several operations in September were illustrative. Two MLN members were killed in the poorly timed bombing of a bowling alley. A seemingly ill-conceived operation involving the multi-million-dollar burning of a textile warehouse, which robbed Uruguayans of jobs and profits, was unpopular with the general populace. Similarly, Tupamaro documents first claimed and later disowned operation "hot summer," a plan designed to scare off the country's lucrative tourist trade. In fact, the latent terrorist threat, combined with poor weather, resulted in a drop in tourism earnings from nearly \$40 million in 1970 to about \$20 million this year. The denial of authorship of the plan was another effort to evade responsibility for an action that adversely affected the average Uruguayan.

From the outset of the terrorist problem, President Pacheco has taken a tough stand. He was the first Latin American leader to refuse any dealings with kidnapers, and he has shown little disposition to change this policy. Nonetheless, the government's over-all record of achievement against the terrorists remains mixed.

Despite the large number of terrorists imprisoned, the group remains capable of mounting fairly large scale operations. The kidnaping of British Ambassador Jackson in January was an elaborately staged affair that involved an estimated 40 to 50 people. In addition, the jailed MLN members still enjoy considerable freedom of action. Messages from the prison clearly indicate that these leaders play a role in determining strategy and objectives.

The President's shuffling of ministers has at times borne the mark of a clumsy political operation that has done little to increase government effectiveness. The competent undersecretary of defense, Carlos Piran, who appeared to be assuming a major role in the organization of an

intelligence apparatus resigned from the government in April. The President's closure of leftist publications by executive order has earned him enmity from a legislature accustomed to consultation and responsibility and concerned about the abridgement of press freedom. Although Pacheco has been granted unprecedented suspensions of constitutional guarantees on two occasions, similar requests to Congress have been rebuffed during the last few months.

Who Are the Tupamaros?

The Tupamaros have a professional organizational image with limited emphasis on individual leaders. Sendic, by personal inclination, was opposed to any personality cult and seemed to make a real effort to subordinate his identity to that of the organization. The emphasis on clandestinity and autonomy aided the effort. The group has survived the imprisonment of almost all its early key leaders, and others have replaced them in the decision-making apparatus. The Tupamaros' growth from a nucleus of about two dozen people into a group still capable of a high level of activity despite the imprisonment of several hundred of its members is the result of several factors.

Prior to the appearance of the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan political scene had no leftist organization whose revolutionary fervor went much beyond a sterile ideological exercise. The large, legal Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) with a membership of about 40,000 is a soft-line, pro-Moscow party and an established part of the political process. Therefore, when the pro-Castro congressional deputy Ariel Collazo established his Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO) in the early 1960s, it grew quickly to a membership of nearly 1,000 with about 5,000 sympathizers, a number of whom were probably drawn from the PCU. It too, however, proved to be largely an exercise in polemics. The Tupamaros, who both preached and practiced an activist line, probably siphoned off a significant number of converts from organizations such as the MRO, PCU, and

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other minor splinter groups on Uruguay's far left. Not surprisingly, the MRO has since faded to the point where it now commands no more than about three to four dozen activists.

In 1968, the police estimated that the MLN terrorists numbered 50 activists and about 1,000 supporters or peripheral members. By the end of 1970, official police estimates had climbed to 1,000 activists and 3,000 collaborators and supporters—probably an overestimation. The terrorists had conclusively demonstrated that with about 200 active militants, they were a formidable opponent for the security forces. At present, despite the arrests, they probably still have that number of active militants at large.


As several of the Tupamaros' operations have made evident, the organization possesses a significant technical capability. Priests, politicians, doctors, and lawyers have been discovered in guerrilla ranks. Despite the presence of such talent, the list of those arrested makes it apparent that the majority of the rank-and-file activists are disaffected youth. The median age is only about 25 years, too young for the individual to be established in a profession. Some of the terrorists used in harassing attacks against private residences have been in the 17 to 21 age group.

Despite their tarnished image with the public at large, the Tupamaros command a substantial following at the university, and their exploits have earned them public plaudits from both students and faculty. Sympathy—and radicalism—extends into secondary school ranks as well. The terrorists have made some effort to organize support committees in high schools, and outbreaks of violence last year prompted President Pacheco to close down secondary institutions until he could reopen them under strengthened government control.

The schools thus present a ready pool of educated, middle-class youth who see the Tupamaros as the only viable alternative to a decaying system. The University of the Republic in Montevideo has more than 18,000 students, and it probably will not require a major recruitment effort for the Tupamaros to continue to attract enough people to sustain their operations at or around the present level for the near future. Their apparent use of raw recruits in recent operations, although indicative of police successes, also attests to their continued attractiveness to youth.

Youths have gravitated to the MLN from all points of the political spectrum. The son of Carlos Quijano, a noted leftist intellectual and newspaper publisher, is a Tupamaro. Raul Bidegain, a high-level MLN activist arrested last August, is the son of a former police chief. Both sons of a Blanco party senator who was a member of the ruling National Council in 1959-60 were members of the terrorist band; one was killed during the Pando raid and the other is currently in prison.

The Tupamaros are presumed to have access to low-level information in many of the government agencies, and there have also been several disquieting instances of Tupamaro penetrations at a higher level. It is likely that there are MLN



Body of Ricardo Zabalza, son of a senator, who was killed during the guerrilla raid on Pando. *Ecuadorean Magazine Vistazo*, September 1970

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sympathizers, and probably active collaborators, in some of the ministries. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Uruguayans enter the lethargic government bureaucracy at the earliest age possible. Of the 18,000 university students, 50 percent work; government employment accounts for the largest sector of the active labor force.

earn money by day to ease the potential financial strain.

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The Tupamaros have for several years carried on a dialogue with other revolutionary groups, and in scattered instances have extended aid. During the MLN's formative years, the group actively collaborated with the Argentine Tacuara Movement, furnishing shelter in Montevideo to exiles and engaging in combined armed assaults. Several Argentines who traveled to Communist China subsequently passed on their military and political training to their MLN colleagues in 1965. Cooperation between the Argentine and Uruguayan movements apparently continues.

A former member of the police directorate of intelligence and information also admitted supplying the MLN with information. Raids on Tupamaro hideouts have uncovered extensive biographic data and other information on security officials, making it probable that the Tupamaros have continuing access to some police files.

Foreign and Domestic Contacts

The MLN has a close ideological kinship with the Cuban revolution, but internal documents stress the group's self-reliance, and available evidence supports this implicit claim of independence. About two dozen MLN members are known or suspected to have traveled to Cuba, but several were members of other organizations at the time. Beyond this, there is no evidence of Cuban aid or any significant support from abroad. Moscow supports the soft-line PCU in preference to the terrorist MLN.

Circumstantial evidence also suggests the group is free from foreign support. Although MLN upkeep requires a substantial monthly budget, the terrorists have become adept thieves, and the inputs from robberies and ransoms have matched estimated operational expenses. In addition, raids have netted the organization a sizable arsenal, with no need for a foreign arms supply. The group's urban base also allows members to

The MLN has a long-range, grandiose objective of bringing about the unification of revolutionary groups in the southern cone of Latin America and eventually on the entire continent. Uruguayans are less parochial and nationalistic than many of their Latin American brethren, and the Tupamaros will continue to foster cooperation among revolutionary groups and lend aid to the extent permitted by their resources. In addition, Montevideo is a well-known transit point for

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South American revolutionaries and, given the Tupamaros' proven skill at providing documentation and cover, it is reasonable to assume that they have extended aid to other guerrillas as well.

Within Uruguay, the Tupamaros have consulted with several other extremist groups but have shied away from any merger. The MLN has sapped much of the strength from several of its sister organizations and it is confident that they will eventually be caught up in the revolutionary groundswell and have no choice but to meld with the Tupamaro organization.

The Tupamaros and the large Communist Party have eyed each other warily for several years, both conscious that they will eventually be competing for the allegiance of the same individuals. Thus far, however, their common objectives have overcome their mutual suspicions. The Tupamaros now command widespread sympathy in the student sector, and the PCU controls labor. Neither has made a major effort to undercut the influence of the other. The Tupamaros have, however, made a few limited forays into the trade-union field. The Tupamaro strategy attaches considerable importance to the control of labor, and it seems that the MLN threat to the PCU's treasured labor hegemony eventually will put the groups at loggerheads. At present, however, many of their activities are complementary and mutually beneficial.

Future Policy and Prospects

The MLN has parted with its Robin Hood mystique and lost much of the popular appeal it once claimed, but it sacrificed these assets in a calculated effort to advance its revolutionary strategy through an escalation of violence. Tupamaro documents suggest that despite the increased losses, its members feel that their tactics are achieving results.

Although they have failed to force the government to grant any concessions in exchange for hostages, they show no signs of abandoning kidnapping as a tactic. For the moment, they are satisfied with the publicity they gain from a successful kidnapping and with the enhanced reputation resulting from their demonstrated ability to hold hostages for lengthy periods. Both American agronomist Fly and Brazilian consul Gomide were detained for six months in the MLN's so-called "peoples' prisons" before being released early this year. Fly, set free after he suffered a heart attack, had received professional medical treatment in one of several "peoples' hospitals." The Tupamaros' current tactics toward kidnap victims, including trials and sentences for crimes against the people, are designed to emphasize a muckraking image and to lend the organization a quasi-legal facade. The income from ransoms is also a lucrative and attractive side benefit. The terrorists have successfully carried out ten kidnappings and at present hold three hostages. Until the police can break this string of successes, further attempts are a near certainty, and diplomatic personnel will remain prime targets.

Propaganda activities, although no longer the primary focus of the Tupamaros, have not been neglected. The terrorists are well aware that their efforts to expose corruption in government ranks, even through the use of kidnappings, have won generally broad public acceptance. Such actions are likely to continue. During the past year, the Tupamaros on numerous occasions have taken control of downtown movie theaters and factories and held audiences at gunpoint while publicizing the party line. The tactic is of questionable utility, and the improved police response has sometimes made it a costly one. This is likely to be increasingly the case and could prompt the terrorists to abandon the practice. Intimidation efforts such as raids on private residences and similar operations, which entail minimal risk, will continue. The incidence of robberies and bombings is likely to proceed at the pace that has become "normal" for Montevideo in the last two years.

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TUPAMARO KIDNAPINGS 1968-1971

NAME & POSITION	DATE	OUTCOME
Ulyses Pereira Reverbel Head of State Utilities Company and adviser to the President	7 August 1968	Released on 11 August 1968 but kidnaped again on 13 April 1971 and remains hos- tage.
Caetano Pellegrini Giampietro Prominent Banker	9 September 1969	Released on 21 November 1969 after personal friends made a donation to charity.
Daniel Pereira Manelli Judge who had sentenced several Tupamaros	28 July 1970	Released on 4 August 1970
Aloisio Gomide Brazilian consul in Montevideo	31 July 1970	Released on 21 February 1971 in exchange for \$250,000 ran- som paid by his wife.
Daniel Mitrione US AID adviser	31 July 1970	Murdered after Uruguayan Government refused to release "political prisoners"; his body was discovered on 10 August 1970.
Claude Fly US agronomist	7 August 1970	Released on 2 March 1971 af- ter having suffered heart at- tack.
Geoffery Jackson British ambassador in Montevideo	8 January 1971	Remains a hostage.
Guido Berro Oribe Uruguayan Attorney General	10 March 1971	Released on 23 March 1971
Ricardo Ferres Uruguayan financier and businessman	13 April 1971	Remains a hostage.

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The MLN has given a lukewarm and qualified endorsement to the efforts of the new Broad Front—a leftist coalition that could become the first major threat to the two-party dominance of the Colorados and Blancos in more than a century. Although the Tupamaros recognize that a strong Front showing probably will work to their advantage, their primary objective presumably is still to attempt to force the cancellation of elections. Thus chances for the assassination of a prominent public figure or for a major terrorist raid will remain high through the 28 November presidential election. The MLN would choose to hold down the level of violence only if it became convinced that the Front had a reasonable chance to win the elections—an unlikely development at this point.

Police successes and the terrorists' own failings have altered the situation of a year ago, when the initiative threatened to pass into the hands of the Tupamaros. The disruption in the terrorists' ranks has not, however, significantly lessened their over-all capabilities, in part because of their continued ability to replace imprisoned members with new recruits. Other factors continue to work to the guerrillas' advantage as well, such as the still-inefficient penal system and a judiciary that metes out lenient sentences. Continued police problems, such as the legal restraints that hinder

effective interrogation, are contributing factors pointing toward a prolonged period during which the guerrillas will be able to maintain a high level of activity. That level of activity is likely to embarrass the government on occasion and sometimes strain the capability of security forces. As the Tupamaros' strategy makes clear, it is aimed not at a near-term overthrow of the government but designed to prepare a "revolutionary consciousness." The Tupamaros recognize that their ultimate objective is dependent on factors outside their control. In concert with a Communist Party driven underground or into open rebellion by harshly repressive government measures, the Tupamaros could constitute a major threat to stability. Such a situation would be precipitated, however, only by a major government overreaction.

After decades of tranquility, the Tupamaro guerrillas are a disquieting reminder of mounting dissatisfaction with the Uruguayan system, but the government has the resources to withstand a buffeting from terrorist tactics. The government's viability will depend largely on its reaction to the growing challenge centered in the legitimate political arena. The Tupamaros are a highly visible, vocal, and violent part of the over-all challenge, but they are a catalyst for, rather than the focus of, dissent.

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